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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3593 
___________ 
 
CYNTHIA M. YODER, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MORROW, TOMPKINS, TRUEBLOOD & LEFEVRE, LLC;  
MR. RICHARD J. TOMPKINS, ESQ. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-04590) 
District Judge:  Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 7, 2016 
 
Before:   CHAGARES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2016) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Cynthia Yoder appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing her 
complaint with prejudice.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm that order. 
I. 
 Yoder’s complaint, which was brought against private attorney Richard J. 
Tompkins and Tompkins’s Pennsylvania-based law firm (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as “Defendants”), concerned a Pennsylvania state court civil action in which Yoder 
was apparently involved.  Defendants represented the opposing party in that state court 
case, and Yoder’s (federal) complaint alleged that Defendants had sent her a threatening 
letter after she attempted to submit a pro se filing in that case.1  Her complaint claimed 
that Defendants’ conduct amounted to intimidation and harassment, and she argued that 
she was entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania law. 
 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint with prejudice for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  On October 5, 2015, the 
District Court granted the motion over Yoder’s objection, concluding that dismissal was 
                                              
1 The letter, which was authored by Tompkins and attached to Yoder’s complaint, states 
as follows:  “Dear Ms. Yoder:  I have received your most recent correspondence.  Unless 
you are an attorney, you are unable to practice law.  In the event that you send anymore 
documents, I will have no choice but to turn you in to the Pennsylvania Disciplinary 
Board for unauthorized practice.” 
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warranted under Rule 12(b)(1) and that the dismissal should be with prejudice because 
amendment of the complaint would be futile.  This timely appeal followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review 
de novo the District Court’s dismissal of Yoder’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(1).  See 
Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 519, 530 (3d Cir. 2012).  A complaint 
may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) “only if [the claim raised therein] clearly appears 
to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly 
insubstantial and frivolous.”  Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “The threshold to withstand a motion to 
dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(1) is thus lower than that required to withstand a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion.”  Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 In this case, we agree with the District Court that Yoder’s complaint failed to meet 
the threshold to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1).  Because there is no diversity 
jurisdiction in this case,2 the District Court could exercise jurisdiction over her complaint 
only if this civil action “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1331.  Although Yoder’s complaint purported to rely on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, her allegations do not actually implicate that federal statute.  Section 1983 
                                              
2 For a district court to have diversity jurisdiction, “no plaintiff can be a citizen of the 
same state as any of the defendants.”  Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. H.E. 
Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003).  Here, Yoder does not dispute 
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provides a basis for relief only when the (1) plaintiff is deprived of a federal right, and 
(2) the defendant(s) who deprived her of that right acted under color of state law.  See 
Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995).  As the District 
Court explained, Yoder’s allegations do not implicate a federal right and Defendants 
were not acting under color of state law.  See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 
F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being 
an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law’ within the meaning of 
§ 1983.”) (quoting Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981)).3  Because Yoder’s 
purported § 1983 claim was “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” the District Court’s 
dismissal of her complaint for lack of jurisdiction was proper.  Furthermore, because we 
agree with the District Court that amendment of the complaint would be futile, the 
District Court did not err when it dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  See United 
States ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 We have considered Yoder’s various arguments in her appellate brief and 
conclude that none has merit.  Accordingly, and in light of the above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  To the extent that Yoder requests appointment of counsel, that 
                                                                                                                                                  
the District Court’s finding that all of the parties are citizens of Pennsylvania. 
3 Yoder’s complaint mentions in passing the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 3771, which provides certain rights to “crime victims.”  But that statute has no 
bearing on this case, for there is no indication that Yoder qualifies as a “crime victim.”  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A) (defining “crime victim” as “a person directly and 
proximately harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in 
the District of Columbia”).  
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request is denied.  To the extent that she requests any other relief from this Court, that 
request is denied, too.    
